P
revious analyses of the US Endangered Species Act (ESA) have attempted to identify limitations in the recovery process (Rohlf 1991 , Miller et al. 1994 , Easter-Pilcher 1996 , Foin et al. 1998 . Some have argued that meager funding is a factor inhibiting the overburdened endangered species recovery program, while others contend that the program is overfunded and not cost effective (Bean 1991 , Clark 1994 , Miller et al. 1994 , Baker 1999 ). Yet few analyses have attempted to study the influence of funding on recovery; the shortage of such analyses is due in part to the difficulties in obtaining accurate funding information Chen 1998, Restani and Marzluff 2002) . Nevertheless, recovery planning cannot be translated into actual recovery without the allocation and expenditure of money. Therefore, we believe that the difficulties inherent in dealing with financial data are far outweighed by the potential importance of knowing the relationship between those data and endangered species recovery.
This article addresses these two questions: What is the relationship between spending and subsequent changes in a species' status? and How does the nature of the threats to an endangered species influence this relationship? We use the answers to these questions to estimate the cost to society of an improved endangered species recovery program. The costs of recovering endangered species need to be clearly defined in order for the public and Congress to make well-informed decisions regarding the value of endangered species recovery.
Proportion of requested money spent (P)
Our data set encompasses the 243 endangered species that have recovery plans and budget estimates from 1989 through 1995. This sample is taxonomically representative of all listed species. The estimated costs of recovery within the 1989-1995 period were recorded from the recovery plans of each species. The Reports to Congress on Federal and State Expenditures for the fiscal years 1989-1995 (the only years for which such reports exist) were used to record the money spent on each species during this period (USFWS 1989 (USFWS -1995 .
The proportion P (money spent divided by money requested in the recovery plan) was calculated to control for the inherent large variability in recovery costs between species (e.g., $4,076,000 requested in 1995 for grizzly bears [Ursus arctos] versus $34,000 requested in 1995 for Dudley Bluff's bladderpod [Lesquerella congesta]). The median values of P were used to control for outliers.
The median P was plotted for species in each of four status categories: improving, stable, declining, and uncertain. We omitted the extinct category because of the small number of cases (n = 2) (USFWS 1999) . These categories show the status of each species in 1996, immediately after the period during which funding was analyzed. The data revealed a positive trend in median P across the gradients: uncertain (P = 0.09), declining (P = 0.15), stable (P = 0.27), and improving (P = 0.37) (Figure 1 ).
This trend held for each of the taxonomic groups (e.g., birds, invertebrates, plants) when viewed independently (excluding groups with a sample size n less than 10). However, the distributions within all status categories show high variance and are positively skewed with modes of P less than 0.20. The median P is only 0.18 when all species are combined.
Logistic regression was used to test for the statistical significance of P as a predictor of species' status. Because the regression resulted in nonsignificant chi-squares for covariates, species were grouped between the combined categories of improving and stable (p = 0.122) and declining and uncertain (p = 0.104). With species' status represented as a Forum binomial dependent variable (for improving and stable, n = 109; for declining and uncertain, n = 131), the model yielded a significant value for the chi-square for covariates test (p = 0.0085). Therefore, as P increases, the likelihood that a species' status is improving increases significantly.
There are two likely explanations for the observed relationship between increased spending and improved status. First, spending levels influence status in subsequent years. Second, the observed trend is an artifact of deliberate funding by the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) of species with a high likelihood of recovery. Several factors suggest that the former explanation is more important. Recovery potential is a binary variable (high or low) that is included in the priority rank for each species. We found that the median P was approximately equal for species whether their recovery potential was high or low (P = 0.1852 and P = 0.1845, respectively). A logistic regression was used to test the relationship between recovery potential and median P. The results yielded a nonsignificant relationship between P and recovery potential (p = 0.44), which suggests that funding was not deliberately spent on species with high recovery potential. Additionally, up to 75 percent of available funds in a given year were earmarked by Congress for a select few species, presumably based more on political than biological considerations (USFWS 1992) .
The median P was calculated for the major taxonomic groups. Birds had the highest median P (0.49), followed by amphibians (0.45), fish (0.35), mammals (0.30), reptiles (0.26), invertebrates (0.19), and plants (0.11). Those taxa receiving the least of their requested funds (invertebrates and plants) accounted for 68 percent of the 960 listed US species in 1996. This percentage and congressional earmarking may be the primary factors driving the low overall median P (0.18). These least funded and most numerous taxa stand to gain the most if appropriations for all listed species increase.
To address the concern that our sample size may be too small or biased (or both) within specific taxonomic groups, we also analyzed the relationship between species' status and the total amount spent on a species' recovery during these years. This analysis allowed the sample to be extended to all endangered species listed during the same time period. In all taxonomic groups, the improving species had higher median and mean dollars spent compared with species in all other status categories. The increasing trend across the status categories, from uncertain to declining to stable to improving, holds for mammals, invertebrates, and plants. For birds, amphibians, reptiles, and fish, those species that were stable received equal or fewer total dollars than did declining species. This deviation from the general trend could be a result of reduced spending on stable species among these taxonomic groups. However, it is also possible that using a total, rather than a proportional, statistic introduces "noise" into the relationship between spending and recovery. This potential problem cannot be resolved with available data. Regardless, improving species had the most total spending, and by the same statistic, the taxa with the highest percentage of listed species followed the increasing trend. Thus, the evidence provided by an expanded sample and a less appropriate statistic is consistent with our basic finding: Increased spending improves the chances for overall species recovery.
Effect of funding on threats
A potential source of variance in a species' response to funding and spending may be differences in the nature of the threats limiting species numbers. We created seven categories of threat, from which two primary threats to each species were identified (Figure 2) . To estimate the effect of funding and spending on threats, we calculated the proportion of improving and stable species in each category of threat for both high (P is greater than 0.50) and low (P is less than 0.50) spending. We also computed changes in the proportion of improving and stable species between high and low spending.
In general, species threatened by extractive resource threats, direct human-caused mortality (e.g., hunting, pesticide poisoning, automobiles), natural threats, and development show a positive relationship with increased P. Species threatened by exotic species; dams, drainage, and diversion; and altered disturbance regimes show little response to an increase in P (Figure 2 ). Wilcove and colleagues (1998) found that for 49 percent of all US imperiled species, exotics were a contributing threat; for 26 percent, the category "dams/drainage/diversion" was a contributing threat; and for approximately 12 percent, altered disturbance regimes were a contributing threat. Thus, the nature of the threats impacting species may be a source of some of the noise in our data, and also suggests how complex and challenging recovery will be for some species.
Although data are not available to test the mechanisms behind these relationships, we argue that the Endangered Species Act has the leverage to address some threats much more effectively than it can address others. Many of the extractive resource threats occur on federal land and thus require section 7 consultation under the ESA; the "no take" policy of section 10 and the recent advent of Habitat Conservation Plans provide tools to directly limit the harm caused by development; hunting and pesticide regulations and law enforcement can control direct human-caused mortality of listed species. In these cases, the ESA gives the USFWS an effective way to spend funds and address principle threats.
In contrast, as threats begin to encompass more complex biological and political factors, increased funding and spending may not so readily result in improved status. For example, the necessary biological action for the recovery of species threatened by dams may be dam removal. But because dam removal is politically infeasible, large sums of money are instead spent on indirect actions such as captive breeding, and decline in the wild may continue (Meffe 1992) . Similarly, because exotics are biologically difficult and economically costly to control, they are controlled over only a small fraction of the listed species' range. For example, the largest area in which rats have been effectively removed is 1000 acres on the Laysan islands (Rob Shallenberger, USFWS, personal communication, 1999) . Interestingly, many of the improving and stable species threatened by exotics and altered disturbance regimes (e.g., ash meadows species) have narrow ranges compared with those species still declining (e.g., black-capped vireo [Vireo atricapillus]), which suggests a testable hypothesisnamely, a narrow range contributes to recoverability because threats are more easily controlled over small areas.
Cost to society
How much would it cost society for a more successful US recovery program? Our data suggest that increased federal and state appropriations (and subsequent spending) are likely to result in improved levels of recovery for more species (certainly many species also benefit from funds derived from private sources). To obtain an estimate of the cost to society of an improved-not complete-recovery program, we use the definition of success implied by USFWS in its 1996 report to Congress (USFWS 1999) : A recovery program might be considered successful if species' status is stable or improving (not necessarily recovered to the point of delisting) and if threats to species' continued existence are stable or diminishing in the wild. We then choose a pragmatic approach to estimating recovery costs: Funding should be allocated at the level of P beyond which our data suggest (based on qualitative inspection) that there would be considerable diminishing returns in the proportion of species entering into the improving and stable categories.
Species in each status category were tallied in bins of spending: P is less than 0.33, P = 0.33-0.66, and P is greater than 0.66. There was a 17 percent increase in improving and stable species when P increased from less than 0.33 to a figure between 0.33 and 0.66. When the spending increased from this midrange (0.33-0.66) to greater than 0.66, there was only a 3 percent increase of species. Therefore, focusing on spending that is in the midrange (0.33-0.66) and using the midpoint of P = 0.50, we observe that 54 percent of the species in our data set are either improving or stable. This result compares with an overall success rate of 37 percent in 1996. Although a precise prediction would be misleading, our data suggest a substantial increase in recovery would occur at P = 0.50.
Setting P at 0.50 might appear to be a low objective for a recovery program. It is noteworthy, however, that recovery efforts and the expenditure of money are undertaken by many organizations other than state and federal agencies; for example, the Turner Endangered Species Fund has contributed large amounts of money to the recovery of blackfooted ferrets and numerous other species. For some species, the true P is likely to be above the value we have calculated. Furthermore, by setting P at 0.50, we do not wish to imply that spending half the estimated costs for species' recovery should be the ultimate goal of the program. The ultimate goal should remain the full recovery and delisting of all species. Rather, we hope to show how even a modest increase in spending will likely have a dramatic impact on endangered species recovery.
Assuming minimum federal and state spending at P = 0.50, we calculated the annual cost per species. We assume that it would be unacceptable for several reasons to cut funding for the top 50 species with the highest percentages of funds spent: large charismatic species often act as umbrella species, whereby species with smaller ranges benefit from habitat protected for the needs of sympatric and widerranging umbrella species. (Caro and O'Doherty 1999) ; the USFWS has attempted to set examples with flagship species such as the bald eagle (USGAO 1988) ; and the USFWS is legally bound to respond to litigation, which often results in large expenditures for certain species. Using a constant dollar rate of 1.06 and a 1.24 percent increase in species listed since 1995, we estimated that 1999 costs for an improved recovery program would have been $650 million per year. This figure is approximately $300 million per year above actual spending.
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Figure 2: The change in proportion of improving and stable species between high (P > 0.50 and low P < 0.50) spending, for each threat category.
D i r e c t h u m a n -c a s u e d m o r t a l i t y
To put this figure in context, note the costs of other federal natural resource programs of similar magnitude: below-cost timber sales of $111 million per year; below-cost grazing fees of $50 million per year; irrigation subsidies to farmers of $220 million per year; and subsidies to cotton growers of $220 million per year (Friends of the Earth 1999). These programs cost taxpayers $601 million per year, approximately twice our estimated deficiency in current spending for species' recovery. We do not advocate deletion of these specific programs. Rather, we argue that the cost of an improved recovery program is on a par with what we routinely spend on other natural resource programs.
The analysis and discussion presented thus far account for US threatened and endangered species listed under the Endangered Species Act, but these species constitute only a subset of species that are imperiled based on biological criteria (Master et al. 2000) . According to the Natural Heritage Central Database, there are 3292 species in the United States that are considered possibly extinct, critically imperiled, or imperiled (Master et al. 2000) . Because of the similarity of threats facing species within the United States (e.g., loss of habitat, overharvesting, invasions by exotic species), we would expect this larger set of US imperiled species to show similar improvements with increased funding and spending. If the recovery program were expanded to include all of these 3292 species, the 1999 cost would have been $1.7 billion a year. This figure is one-eight-hundredth of the cost of the recent tax bill, a relatively small investment for the maintenance of a portion of our natural resource capital.
Although it is tempting to further extrapolate our findings to global lists-the IUCN (International Conservation Union) lists 38,623 critically endangered, endangered, or vulnerable species worldwide-such a figure would have little meaning. Our data are based on costs within a unique US social and governmental infrastructure, and a large error would likely be introduced into such a global estimate. For example, in the United States there already exist large federal agencies responsible for managing US natural resources, a set of laws that (in theory) hold violators of the ESA accountable, substantial holdings of protected lands, and an extensive system of over 3000 conservation groups.Yet although our findings cannot be extrapolated to provide a cost of global endangered species recovery efforts, our fundamental finding is likely relevant: Conservation cannot be achieved without the investment of resources and capital.
Discussion
Claims that the USFWS and ESA are ineffective appear to be erroneous. Our data indicate that they are likely to be more effective if more appropriations are provided and spent. Despite the complexity of the recovery process, species that have higher proportional spending have an improved chance of achieving a status of improving or stable. The accuracy of this relationship cannot be estimated because the accuracy of budget requests and spending and status reports is unknown. However, we believe that inaccuracies would have been more likely to weaken an existing strong trend-the relationship of spending to stable or improved status-than to create an artifactual one. The relationship is also likely to have been weakened by the short time period across which P was calculated and by the fact that species' status was measured shortly after this period, both of which would exclude positive responses by species whose recovery would have necessitated longer time scales. Additional noise may have been introduced into the relationship of spending to species' recovery by failing to account for efforts and expenditures contributed by nonfederal, nonstate agencies.
Current funding is less than 20 percent of the amount we estimate it will take to get the job done. This illustrates that the passage of legislation such as the Endangered Species Act does not guarantee the funding that is essential to fulfill the law's mandates. If the public values biodiversity and endangered species, more congressional funds will need to be appropriated for the endangered species program. In addition, once endangered species begin to recover, fewer restrictions will be placed on landowners and resource users, which will decrease the indirect costs of endangered species recovery that are currently borne by the public.
Of course, the amount of money spent is undoubtedly not alone in determining the recovery of species. Also important is how the money is spent. How efficient and effective is onthe-ground conversion of money into recovery? Is there some combination of biological and political factors inhibiting recovery despite funding? Some species may vary from the trend because high P does not directly address their primary causes of endangerment. Indeed, our data suggest a substantial difference in species recovery in response to funding and spending, because of the specific threats that limit species. Clearly, the larger ecological, economic, and social context that surrounds a species is critical in determining its recoverability . Failure to assess the importance of the larger context can largely be attributed to a lack of attainable information. Recovery plans do not generally include a discussion of such real-world recovery feasibility, and the US-FWS does not maintain centralized records of recovery actions undertaken. Until such information is gathered, we will be unable to move beyond analyses focused on recovery planning and toward crucial analyses of the recovery process itself. We recommend the development of a centralized database system and honest quantification of real-world limitations facing species.
As a result of inadequate funding and spending and perceived failure of the USFWS to recover species, previous reviewers of the endangered species program have suggested triage (Mann and Plummer 1995) . With half of the listed species having a P less than or equal to 0.18, we are practicing something far worse than triage. Our current scenario is akin to starving hospitalized patients (Restani and Marzluff 2002) and then grilling the doctors about why more patients are not recovering. Contrary to claims that recovery costs are simply prohibitive, our results suggest that the cost to society of a substantially improved endangered species program 
